與西藏同行

互聯網照片

facebook上,有人張貼了集會消息,名為「3.10與西藏且同行—紀念西藏抗暴53周年燭光晚會」,舉辦時間是三月十日(星期六)下午5時到8時,地點在尖沙咀文化中心自由戰士雕像下,並會遊行至中聯辦。另外,不同宗教團體於三月十四日(星期三)晚上7時30分至9時,舉行「為西藏宗教自由祝願燭光晚會」,地點是中華基督教會深愛堂(石硤尾窩仔街80號鄰近銘賢中學,地鐵站A出口轉右),主題是關注西藏地區的宗教迫害及人權狀況。

西藏問題極為敏感,香港主流傳媒近來越來越不敢觸碰,不過,民間對西藏的關注正在增加。一些個人及宗教體冒著被標籤「支持藏獨」的危險,表達對西藏人受壓迫的關懷,相當難能可貴。

零九年到現在,已有26名藏人以自焚方式揭露中共統治西藏的深層次矛盾,但未能引起中國漢人的關注,國際社會也愛理不理。

轉貼自《看不見的西藏》

而在北京的藏人作家唯色,在美國的阿嘉仁波切,在安多的詩人嗄代才讓聯合發表聲明,「籲請藏人再勿自焚:壓迫再大也要留住生命」。他們在聲明寫道︰

「……自焚表達了藏人的意志。二十六起自焚, 已經表達得足够充分。但是表達意志不是最終目的,而是要把意志变成現實。

只有活著的生命,才能把意志变成現實。如果再繼續自焚,每一個生命都是不可挽回的損失。……」

大家有興趣可上Twitter向唯色留下姓名,以示對藏人的支持。

 在facebook上又看到一張照片和報道,三名西藏人冒著嚴寒在紐約聯合國總部外絕食。他們不是香港象徵式的「絕食」,而是絕食了十多天。這則自由亞洲電台於美國時間三月六日的報道指︰

「他們向聯合国秘書長潘基文的辦公室遞交了請願信。提出五點要求,包括:聯合國應派出調查團,查證西藏的情况;向中国施壓,停止在西藏的戒嚴;允許國際媒體進入西藏報道;解放政治犯;停止『愛國洗腦教育』。西藏青年大會主席次旺仁增對記者說,次旺仁增指,西藏人以自焚方式抗議,足以證明在中共统治下,他們多麼不滿。這三位藏人覺得自己遭受風霜雨雪也都不算甚麼。
 
踏入三月,又連續三天傳出藏人自焚身亡的消息。首先是一個19歲的女學生。之後,是32歲的四個孩子的母親,她最小的孩子只有幾個月。昨天是一個18歲的男孩。
 
西藏青年會在其傳單中稱,如果聯合國在維護人權上不作為,就是中共的幫兇;如果不立即採取行動熄滅西藏燃燒的火焰,每一個死亡的藏人也就有他們的責任。」

灰記不知道這三名西藏人會否無限期絕食。而無限期絕食等於白白餓食,果真如此,又會否引起聯合國及國際社會的關注?

三十多年前,被囚的愛爾蘭共和軍成員Bobby Sand,為抗議北愛爾蘭被英國佔領,在獄中絕食至死。不知今天在北愛爾蘭以至愛爾蘭,會否有人紀念這位「民族英雄」。這幾位西藏人現在的抗議行動,性質和當年Bobby Sand差不多,都是為了自己故土的自由發出「最後」的呼籲。

當年Bobby Sand以及愛爾蘭共和軍被西方主流傳媒形容為恐怖份子,但當年的左翼刊物都支持愛爾蘭共和軍的抗英行動,例如灰記熟悉的一些北美小型共產黨機關刊物,都支持愛爾蘭共和軍對抗英殖民統治,對Bobby Sand絕食至死深感惋惜 。今天,要求西藏自由的藏人被中國官方形容為分裂份子,自焚者亦被中國當局稱作罪犯,西方傳媒則較有同情的筆觸。但西方政府為了維持與中國的關係,並不願意為藏人自焚事件作出太多動作。

至於西方的左翼刊物,會否如當年一樣,堅決高舉民族自決,反對殖民統治的大旗,為西藏人仗義發言?灰記上網搜查,結果發現有兩份左翼刊物,New Left Review《新左評論》、International Socialism《國際社會主義》曾就零八年西藏人起義,中國稱為騷亂事件作出回應。

《國際社會主義》由Charlie Hore撰寫了一篇題為「中國、西藏及左翼」China, Tibet and the Left 的文章,分析國際左翼應否支持西藏起義,作者的結論是應該。

作者從西藏的一些現況,試圖理解個別藏人襲擊漢人及漢人所開店舖的過火行動︰

這些襲擊是自八零年代以降的經濟高速發展的產物,特別在高速發展的拉薩並沒有惠及大部分藏人,大部分的發展機會掌握在漢人和回族人移民手上。這些移民冷待,甚至歧視藏人。再加之不斷增多的遊客(07年有200萬)更令西藏人感到自己在自己的地方被擠壓。(灰記︰一些香港人應該十分理解西藏人在自己的地方被擠壓的感受)。在此情況下,藏人把怨憤發洩於中國的店舖便一點不出奇。正如六十年代非洲裔美國人攻擊白人店舖一樣,因為漢人店舖和白人店舖一樣﹐象徵民族壓迫。其實中國警察在「恢復秩序」時,施行比此嚴重得多的暴力。(These attacks are a product of the rapid economic development of Tibet since the 1980s, which has seen Lhasa in particular grow very fast, but without benefiting the majority of Tibetans. Most of the new jobs and economic opportunities have been taken by Han and Hui Chinese migrants, who are at best indifferent to and at worst racist towards Tibetans. In addition, the growing numbers of Chinese tourists (over two million last year) exacerbate the sense that Tibetans are being squeezed out of Lhasa, except as “exotic" tourist attractions. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Tibetans should take out their frustrations on Chinese businesses, in much the same way as African-American rioters in the US in the 1960s targeted white-owned businesses that symbolised their oppression. But much greater violence was meted out by the Chinese police and army in “restoring order".)

在臨近結尾寫道︰我們應否支持個別流亡西藏組織、西藏獨立是否可行、獨立西藏的邊界如何劃分,都是次要問題。重要的是零八年的抗議和騷亂,最終顯示藏人反抗中國統治的生命力,以及在青海、甘肅及四川藏區,藏人的民族覺醒。正如社會主義者歡迎對中國政權的其他挑戰,所以我們也應該歡迎藏人的反抗。(Whether we support particular Tibetan organisations, whether Tibetan independence is feasible, what the borders of an independent Tibet might be: these are secondary questions. What is important about the riots and protests of 2008 is that they have conclusively demonstrated the vitality of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule and an awakening of Tibetan national consciousness in Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan. Just as socialists welcome other challenges to the power of the Chinese state, so we should welcome these.)

作者又說,看到反資本主義理論家,如香港左翼圈子紅人齊澤克支持中國統治西藏,認為這對普通西藏百姓更好,感到震驚。他們的觀點反映一些左翼人士對要批評中國感到不舒服。(But it was a genuine shock to see anti-capitalists such as Michael Parenti or Slavoj Zizek defending Chinese rule as being good for ordinary Tibetans. Their arguments echoed a more widespread unease among some left wingers about any criticism of China.)

看看齊澤克其中一個認為中國統治西藏是好事的觀點︰

事實上,中國大量投資發展西藏經濟,以及基建、教育和醫療。直接一點說,儘管中國對西藏的壓迫,藏人的生活水平前所未有的提高。在中國西部一些省份有更惡劣的貧窮問題,造磚廠有童工,監獄情況甚為可怖等。(It is a fact that China has made large investments in Tibet’s economic development, as well as its infrastructure, education and health services. To put it bluntly: in spite of China’s undeniable oppression of the country, the average Tibetan has never had such a high standard of living. There is worse poverty in China’s western rural provinces: child slave labour in brick factories, abominable conditions in prisons, and so on.)

不過作者反駁這種觀點︰

從歷史看,西藏人一有機會便會反對中國的統治和影響。為中國「有權」統治西藏辯護,實際上意味為中國有權強制對藏人操控作辯解。這些辯解被認為合理往往因為舊西藏政權很壞,1959年前的西藏社會的確極度貧窮,疾病叢生,由農奴主統治。但這種說法同樣可用來替英國、法國、西班牙或荷蘭,對非洲、亞洲及拉丁美洲的殖民統治作辯解。幾乎沒有任何一個他們殖民的舊社會是我們希望再次重現的。西藏的所謂「歷史進程」似乎越來越難有說服力。(What the history shows is that, given the opportunity, the tendency was for Tibetans to reject Chinese rule or influence. Defending China’s “right" to rule Tibet means, in effect, defending China’s right to impose its control over the population by force. This is often justified by the awfulness of the old Tibetan regime, and it is true that Tibet before 1959 was a desperately poor, disease-ridden society ruled by feudal slave-owners. But the same defence could be made of British, French, Spanish or Dutch colonial conquests in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Almost none of the societies they colonised were ones we would want to see re-established. And the claims of “historical progress" in Tibet seem increasingly difficult to justify. )

左翼評論》則訪問了在加拿大教學的西藏學者,《龍在雪域︰一九四七後的西藏》的作者茨仁夏加,對零八年所發生的事的看法。灰記看過茨仁夏加這本講述四七年至九零年初西藏歷史的書,覺得這位學者儘管站在藏人立場寫歷史,但態度相當客觀持平,沒有抹殺中共在西藏的建設,也沒有掩飾西藏舊社會及統治精英的腐敗無能。現在節譯一些內容供參考︰

抗議主要因為西藏民族主義還是與經濟及社會議題有關?
(Was the issue of Tibetan nationalism the overriding one, or were some of the protests focused on economic or social issues?)

涉及很多事情。但如果你看示威者的橫額和口號,沒有明言爭取獨立。我認為最主要訴求是希望中國當局容許達賴喇嘛回到西藏以及人權問題。在拉薩的示威,針對的是中國政府及中共,亦針對定居那裡的中國人,漢人店舖被焚燒,漢人被毆打等。但這些只發生於拉薩。在其他地區,示威者走到政府大樓或黨總部,扯下中國國旗,掛上雪山獅子旗,很少有漢人被襲擊。在拉薩的漢人之所以被襲擊,主要因為那裡的漢人移民與當地藏人經濟地位有顯著的差別,漢人擁有當地酒店、商店、餐廳,因此很顯眼,亦成為發洩怒火的對象。相反在鄉村地區,藏人和漢人經濟地位差別不大,不會因此而遷怒於漢人。當然,藏人與外來者的矛盾是存在的。例如在藏東,農民於夏天採集野菌、冬蟲草等珍貴藥材,以幫幫生計。現在很多漢人到山上採集這些東西。雖然政府以徵費作出限制,但漢人因為利潤高而繼續採集。本地反對外人毫無節制的採集活動,宣稱這樣長遠會對當地環境造成損害。爭奪資源近來變得越來越厲害。(People talked about many things, but if you look at the slogans and banners the protesters were carrying, there was no explicit demand for independence; I think the main issue was getting China to allow the Dalai Lama to come back to Tibet, as well as human rights. It’s true that the protests in Lhasa were against the Chinese government and the Party, but also against ordinary Chinese people who have settled in Tibet-Chinese shops were burnt, ethnic Chinese were beaten. But it was really only in Lhasa that this took place. In other regions the demonstrators rushed to government offices or Communist Party headquarters, taking down the Chinese flag and hoisting the Tibetan one, ransacking official buildings; there were very few attacks on ethnic Chinese. The reason they were the target of public anger in Lhasa and not elsewhere is that the disparity between the migrants’ success and the status of the indigenous is so glaringly obvious there-the Chinese own hotels, shops, restaurants, and are therefore much more visible. In rural areas, by contrast, the economic disparity between Tibetans and Chinese is minimal, so there was little resentment based on economic grievances. There are, of course, tensions between Tibetans and outsiders: in eastern Tibet, for example, farmers supplement their income in summer by collecting mushrooms, medicinal plants and yartsa-gunbu-the caterpillar fungus, much prized in traditional Chinese medicine. Now many Han migrants are also going into the hills to harvest these things, and though the government has tried to restrict this by charging them a fee, the profits are still large enough for them to continue. Locals object to what they see as the indiscriminate way the outsiders collect the mushrooms and fungus, claiming they are doing long-term damage to the pastures. This competition over resources has become more intense in recent years.)

但我認為示威主要不是因為經濟不平等或藏人感到利益受損。我認為這是為了保衛民族身份認同而起。北京當局理解八十年代發生的抗議活動(灰記按︰主要發生在寺院),不單是宗教問題,而是西藏「分裂」問題。當時接手的西藏自治區黨委書記胡錦濤,採取一切措施鎮壓任何被認為有「分裂」可能的活動,甚至要求說藏語的權利都被理解為狹獈民族主義及分裂主義。當局質疑每個西藏人的忠誠,每個藏人都被認為可疑。反「分裂」運動亦變成鎮壓黨內異議聲音的藉口,任何不同意政府政令的人都被打成「分裂主義者」。但這政策自食其果,中國當局變得不知如何分辯反政府的活躍份子及普通平民。政府與廣大藏族平民出現巨大鴻溝,其結果是令藏人團結起來。如果只針對寺院,情況不至於如此。事實上,對比八十年代,最近的示威表達強烈而統一的民族主義情緒……(But personally I do not think the demonstrations were principally to do with economic disparities or disadvantages suffered by Tibetans. Rather, I think these were defensive protests, concerning questions of national identity. Beijing interpreted the 1980s protests as not just stemming from religious differences, but as the expression of a separate Tibetan identity. Under Hu Jintao, as tar Party Secretary, policies were targeted against any manifestation of national identity politics; even demands for Tibetan language rights were tarred with the mark of nationalism and separatism. Every Tibetan’s loyalty to China was questioned. Everyone became a suspect. The campaign against separatism also became an excuse for clamping down on dissenting voices-within the Communist Party, anyone who opposed a government directive was often accused of being a separatist. But the policy backfired. The Chinese government became unable to distinguish between those who did actively oppose its policies and the rest, and so succeeded in creating a gulf between the government and the whole Tibetan population. The effect was to unify Tibetans, much more than would have been the case if the monastic community alone had been targeted. Indeed, the recent protests have expressed a much more unified nationalistic sentiment than those of the late 80s……)

現在西藏自治區的鎮壓情況如何?
(What is the current state of repression in the Tibet Autonomous Region?)

目前情況十分惡劣。由於參與示威的人數眾多,由於來自不同階層,政府不能只針對某一族群,例如僧侶。他們看來要針對所有人。當局試圖控制每一個社會層面,令人想起文化大革命。不但受拘押的人要受罸,在中、小學及政府部門,每個人都要寫自我批評。在中國漢地的大學,藏人學生也要自我批評。整個西藏人口都受到衝擊。(At the moment the situation is very bad. Because of the number of people involved in the demonstrations, and because they cut across all classes, the government cannot target one particular group, such as the monasteries; it seems that they have to target everybody. The authorities are trying to exert control at every level of the community, in a way that reminds many people of the Cultural Revolution. It is not only those who have been detained that are subject to punishment-the government is holding meetings in primary and secondary schools, in colleges, government offices, where everyone has to write self-criticisms; so do Tibetan students at university in China. The Tibetan population as a whole is bearing the brunt of this campaign.

你怎樣看最近針對西藏示威的中國民族主義情緒,你會否認為這是一個分水嶺?
How would you characterize the recent wave of Chinese nationalist sentiment, in response to the Tibetan protests-would you say it marks a watershed in the mentality of the prc?

事情很有趣。在網上及在海外所表現的中國民族主義是一種中產階級現象。發這者大都是中國經濟發展的受益人,及十分著意中國國際地位的人。他們對外界事物較多認知。對他們而言,現在的改革政策正確,他們很怕發生任何阻礙經濟發展的事。但沿海及內陸有巨大差異,在貧窮的省份如甘肅、青海及其他沒有受惠現存政策的地區,這種民族主義並不興盛。然後五月十二日的汶川大地震衝擊中國人的自信。為何學校倒塌而高級酒店及私人商廈無損。越來越多人質疑中國現狀……
(This is very interesting. The Chinese nationalism currently exhibited on the internet and abroad is essentially a middle-class phenomenon. It is strongly expressed by those who are the main beneficiaries of China’s economic success, and who are most conscious of the country’s global standing. They are also more exposed to what is happening outside. They feel that, for them, the reforms are going in the right direction; they are afraid of anything that will hamper China’s economic advance. But there is a great divide between coastal and inland areas in China. You do not find nationalism of this kind in the poorer provinces-in Gansu, Qinghai or other areas-where people have not benefited from the current policies. Then again, the terrible earthquake in Wenchuan on May 12 shattered the confidence in the Chinese state that many people had been expressing only weeks before. Simple questions are being raised about why school buildings collapsed but luxury hotels and private firms did not. There is much more discussion, new questions are being asked about China……)

我認為中國內部也對此也有不同意見。超過三百名知份子簽署由王力雄發起的聲明,批評政府對示威的處理手法及要求對話。不少刊物都刊登類似看法的文章。一些中國律師宣布會為被拘押藏人辯護。這些人如此做會危及生計,中國當局脅不再延續他們的律師登記。這些都不見諸主流傳媒。在漢民族主義狂熱下,這些異議聲音很難被聽到。(I should also say that there is intense diversity within China-it is not as homogeneous as it might appear. Over three hundred intellectuals signed a petition circulated by Wang Lixiong criticizing the government’s response to the unrest in Tibet and appealing for dialogue.  There were similar articles appearing in a range of publications. A group of Chinese lawyers announced that they would go to defend the Tibetan detainees; these people are risking their livelihood-the government is threatening not to renew their licences. This is not what the media highlights, of course. Many of these dissenting voices were not heard amid the patriotic fervour.)

你對未來數月以至長遠的藏中關係發展有何看法?
(How do you see Tibet-China relations developing, over the next months and in the longer term?)

……長遠看,中國共產黨對自己合法性的最強辯解是令到中國統一及更強大,這對中國廣大人民很有說服力。因此,中共不可能在西藏主權問題上退讓,因為任何讓步都會令減低中共政權的合法性。基於此一原因,我不認為奧運會後,中共對藏政策會有任何重大改變。(……In the longer term, one has to understand that one of the Communist Party’s strongest claims to legitimacy today is that it unified China territorially and made it strong. This has great power among the Chinese population. The Party therefore cannot afford to make any concessions on sovereignty with regard to Tibet, since any compromise would weaken the Party’s legitimizing appeal. For this reason, I do not foresee the Party making any major policy changes after the Olympics.)

如果西藏人可以自由表達意見,他們最終的訴求會是甚麼?
(If Tibetans could articulate them freely, what would their essential demands be?)

西藏人其中一個最大的怨憤是不滿中國當局把任何西藏民族身份認同看成分裂主義。政府總認為,如果容許任何文化/民族自主,必然導致分裂。政府必須有所放鬆。在西藏,任何報章雜誌以至音樂的發行都受嚴格控制,而在中國其他地方有越來越多獨立的出版社。在西藏流行一個笑話,達賴喇嘛希望「一國兩制」,但境內藏人希望「一國一制」—他們希望在中國其他地區較寬鬆的政策也可在西藏實施。(One of the biggest grievances is that the Chinese authorities equate any expression of Tibetan identity with separatism. The government seems to think that if it allows any kind of cultural autonomy, it will escalate into demands for secession. This is something the government has to relax. In Tibet, everything from newspapers and magazines to music distribution is kept firmly under control, whereas all over China there are increasing numbers of independent publishing houses. The joke in Tibet is that the Dalai Lama wants ‘one country, two systems’, but what people there want is ‘one country, one system’-they want the more liberal policies that prevail in China also to apply in Tibet.)

現在中共治藏的政策不但沒有放鬆,反而越來越收緊,在二十多個藏人自焚後,一些藏人地區實際處於戒嚴狀態。在西藏以外的人,包括香港人能做的是不斷為西藏人發聲,不管來自甚麼政治背景,左翼或非左翼。因為擺在眼前,西藏所發生的是民族壓迫,不管西藏人是否要求獨立!

 

 

 

One response to “與西藏同行

  1. 現在香港的雙非問題與中共大量漢人殖民西藏的政策同出一轍, 都是中共默許下進行的, 所以為何一提到修改基本法時中共便暗示拒絕
    今天西藏的衝突是藏人文化遭清洗打壓而引發的抗爭
    當有一天吸納大陸文化長大的雙非童比例日益增多時, 中共便有時機不准香港人說廣東話, 不准用正體中文, 不准用港式譯名時後悔已經太遲
    反蝗蟲運動其實就是恐懼香港遭到西藏式的文化滅絕

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